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ABSTRACT
What determines sovereign risk? We study the London bondmarket from the 1870s to the
1930s. Our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold
standard. Before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved 40 to 60
basis points from country borrowing spreads. In the 1920s, however, simply resuming prewar gold
parities was insufficient to secure such benefits. Countries that devalued before resumption were
treated favorably, and markets scrutinized other signals. Public debt and British Empire membership
were important determinants of spreads after World War One, but not before.
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Can macroeconomic policymakers enhance credibility, and thus performance, by
the adoption of a hard currency peg? The experiment is often attempted. In recent
years many countries have tried to end histories of macroeconomic instability
through reform programs based on a ﬁxed exchange rate. The variants of ﬁxed
exchangerates haveranged fromconventionalcurrency pegstocurrency boards to
currencyunionstodollarisation,sometimesaccompaniedbyelaborateinstitutional
engineering meant to enhance credibility with the markets.
Yet the success of these efforts has varied a great deal across countries. In
particular, the Argentine peso’s diastrouscollapse after ten years of parity with the
United States dollar illustrates the difﬁculty nowadays of establishing credibility
even through some of the “harder” variants of currency peg. How should we
interpret such an outcome? We think that an exploration of a large set of historical
episodes could be informative. This paper aims to thow light on the relationship
between exchange rate regimes and credibility by closely examining two adjacent
but very different historical epochs of widespread exchange rate stabilisation, the
classical pre-World War One gold standard period and the years 1925–31 of the
interwar gold standard.
It isnowwidelybelievedthatpriorto1914, goldstandard orthodoxyconferred
credibilityandwas asinequa nonforaccess toglobalcapital marketsonfavorable
terms. Apath-breakingstudybyBordoandRockoff(1996)foundthatadherenceto
gold standard rules acted as a “seal of approval”for sovereign debt. Gold standard
countrieshadlowercountryrisk,measuredbytheirbondspreadsinLondonrelative
to the British consol. By the time the interwar gold standard was reconstituted
starting in 1925, however, the underlying political equilibrium in most economies
had changed, with more political power in the hands of previously disadvantaged
working class parties and a greater awareness of government’s role in steering
economic outcomes (Polanyi, 1944; Temin, 1989; Eichengreen, 1996). Indeed,
divergent interest-group positions on macroeconomic policy were reﬂected in the
high inﬂation rates rampant in the early 1920s and in the national debates over the
appropriate exchange parity—devalued or not—at which to return to gold.
Hard evidence of a new political dynamic might be sought in a changing rela-
tionship between country risk and gold after 1925. With the rules of the game in
question after World War One, perhaps investors doubted that the mere adoption
of a gold standard regime would ensure the repayment of public debts. Consis-
tent with such imperfect credibility, other indicators that could reassure foreign
investorsabout publicsolvency(such as the debt-GDP ratio)or protection of capi-
1tal (such as membership in the British Empire) might have had a bigger impact on
international bond spreads under the reconstituted gold standard than before. Do
the data indeed support these conjectures?
There is no uniform and comprehensive study of bond spreads across the pre-
1914 and interwar gold standards that would allow us deﬁnitively to answer such
questions. A study of interwar spreads by Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoff (1999),
however, came to a conclusion that was surprising, even by the authors’ own
admission.1 Looking solely at 1920s bond yields, they found continued evidence
that the gold standard remained a seal of approval when a country returned to its
prewarexchangeparitywithgold, loweringbondspreadssigniﬁcantlyinthatcase.
Devaluers were not so lucky with their bond spreads: for them, the effect of being
on gold was found to be small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Such ﬁndings seem
to challenge the conventional wisdom that the interwar gold standard was a pale
and less credible shadow of its predecessor.
These are two pioneering studies, but they are not ideal for comparative work
across regimes because of differences in the type of data that each employs. The
former study looked at long-term government bonds in the secondary market, and
examined their yield to maturity; the latter examined new issues and their yield at
themomentofﬂotationonly. Theformerstudythereforehadcompletetimeseries,
whereas the latter had a small sample that was often interrupted by missing data in
yearswhennoissuestookplace—anotuncommoneventinthe1920s,andonethat
raises a potential sample-selection issue (presumably, bonds tend not to be ﬂoated
when conditions are unfavorable). Finally, the former study examined prices in
London,thelatterprices inNew York, adefensibleswitchasthehegemoniccentre
of global capital markets shifted across the Atlantic around this time, and one that
allowed the use of Cleona Lewis’s (1938) ﬁgures on new issues during the 1920s.
To overcomethedifferences between thesetwo earlier investigations,we com-
pare the determinants of bond spreads in the pre-1914 and interwar years using
a consistent set of data for a larger sample of countries from 1870 through 1939.
We focus on a sample of more than 20 diverse countries—some within the British
Empire, some outside, some in the core and some in the periphery—to see how
theircountryriskevolved. Thisallowsustofocusonthesametypeofriskmeasure
across both prewar and interwar eras. To isolate the effects of default (as opposed
toexchangerate)risk,spreadsoverLondonareexclusivelyforbondsdenominated
1See also Ferguson (2001, p. 333), who suggests that the surprising conclusion of the interwar
studythrowsdoubtontheﬁndingsintheoriginalBordo-Rockoffstudyofpre-1914yields. However,
the two studies use very different sources for their yield data, as we explain in a moment.
2in gold or in sterling. Most of our yield-to-maturity data come from the Global
Financial Data (GFD) source and pertain to bonds traded in London. When GFD
didnotreportappropriatedataforgoldorsterling-indexedbonds,however,wecol-
lecteditourselvesfromcontemporaryjournalisticsources, inafew casesresorting
to yield quotations from the New York market.
Figure 1 offers an overview of our yield data over the full period 1870–1939.
The mean bond spreads over London for two subsamples (the Core and Empire
subset and the Periphery Nonempire subsets) are presented in the top and bottom
charts respectively, and each is surrounded by a measure of dispersion, a band
equal to plus or minus two standard deviations.2 The units are percentage points
and the scales are deliberately the same on the two charts.
The differences between the two subsamples are very striking: the core had
much smaller country risk than the periphery, as expected. Core and empire coun-
tries usually had interest rates within one or two percentage points of Britain’s, at
least from 1880 to 1930. The periphery could have spreads as large as ﬁve, ten,
or even twenty percentage points, the latter spread usually tantamount to being in
default.
The ﬁgures also show some similarities, once we normalise for this scale dif-
ference. Both core and periphery experienced aconvergencein bondspreads up to
1914. Forbothcountrygroupingsweobservegooddealofvolatilityintheinterwar
years, when spreads widened, but there appears to have been some convergence
during Britain’s brief interwar return to gold, 1925–31. We seek to understand the
gold standard’s role in these two convergence episodes.
Our empirical analysis allows public indebtedness to play a role in determin-
ing borrowing spreads. Macroeconomic variables correlated with gold-standard
adherence, such as public debt, might be responsible for the apparent pre-1914
beneﬁts of going on gold, or might mask such beneﬁts after the World War One.
Before the war, countries on gold may have had more disciplined ﬁscal policies,
lower public debt, and hence more favorable treatment by the bond markets. On
the other hand, countries that inﬂated away their public debts in the early or mid-
1920swouldhavebeenunlikelytorejoingoldatprewarparity,makinghighpublic
debts and a return to gold at par positively correlated variables. In these circum-
stances, onemajorconcern is that failing to controlfor publicdebt could lead us to
2ThecorecountriesareAustralia,Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,NewZealand,
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. The empire countries are Australia, Canada, India, New
Zealand, and South Africa. The peripherynonempirecountriesare Argentina,Austria (or Austria-
Hungary), Brazil, Chile, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
(or the Ottoman Empire), and Uruguay.
3Figure 1: London Bond Spreads, Core and Periphery, 1870–1940
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4overestimate the prewar beneﬁt of gold standard adherence and underestimate the
postwar beneﬁt of returning to gold at the prewar exchange rate. A contribution of
the paper is its collection and use of historical series on the public debts of a large
number of borrowing countries.3,4
This paper’s ﬁndings reinstate conventional wisdom concerning the low credi-
bilityoftheinterwargoldstandard. WeconﬁrmtheBordo-Rockoff(1996)ﬁndings
on the pre-war gold standard, notwithstanding a larger country sample and the in-
clusion of a wider set of macro-fundamental determinants of spread. Before the
First World War, gold standard adherence was an effective credibility signal that
shavedabout40to60basispointsfromacountry’sexternalpublicborrowingcost.
Theinterwar results below, however, suggest that in the 1920s, returning to gold at
prewar parity no longer was enough to soothe international investors. After World
War One, there was no signiﬁcant “good housekeeping”effect of returning to gold
at prewar parity. At best, it was the countries returning to gold at depreciated
levels that gained; and they gained somewhat less than had prewar gold adherents.
Moreover, public debt and Empire membership were important determinants of
borrowing spreads after World War One, though not before.
3Bordo and Rockoff (1996) examined the effect on borrowing spreads of the public deﬁcit
relative to GDP, a ﬂow variable, but found it to be statistically insigniﬁcant. Our experimentswith
thedeﬁcit variableled tothe samenegativeconclusion. Ifwe wishto assess solvency,however,the
stock variable, public debt, seems preferable. Based on a speciﬁcation that includes public debt,
Flandreau et al. (1998) ﬁnd prewar spread effects of gold-standard adherence similar in size to
those reported by Bordo and Rockoff (about 35–55 basis points). We discuss the relation between
our results and those of Flandreau et al. below.
4The discussion of omitted ﬁscal variables points to a deeper identiﬁcation problem in any
attempt to pinpointa “pure” yield effect of gold standard adherence. Countries’ decisions over the
monetary regime are in most cases endogenously determined, and without controlling for a broad
rangeof economicandpolitical variables, one cannotknowwhether bondspreadsare beingdriven
by gold adherence per se or by the domestic economic circumstances that facilitate adherence
or force suspension. We therefore urge extreme caution in the interpretation of our estimated
spread “effects” of the gold standard. We can legitimately infer from them, not a gold impact
that is independent of other economic factors, but merely a partially unconditional average beneﬁt
accruing to countries in a position to adopt the gold standard. During both of the eras we study
countries able to adopt gold by and large did so, and we believe that our results do provide a
valid approach to understanding how the credibility of gold commitments changed after the First
World War. In our empirical examination of the interwar period below, we attempt to control in a
crude way for the globaldisruptionsforcinggold standard departuresstarting in 1929. We hope to
addressexplicitlytheregimeselectionprobleminfuturework,althoughanalysisiscomplicatedby
the very diverse scenarios through which various countries have adopted or left the gold standard
at different times. Meissner (2002) models empirically the spread of the prewar gold standard.
52 Five suggestive cases
Case studies are suggestive but not deﬁnitive; we present ﬁve for purposes of
illustration. Ultimately, careful examination of a broader range of cases would be
a useful complement to the more aggregative econometric analysis that we carry
out in the next section.
In the United States the Resumption Act came into force in January 1875. The
Act legislated a return to a uniﬁed gold-backed currency on January 1, 1879. To
assess the effect of gold standard adherence on United States government bond
spreads, we must account for the fact that the return to gold was anticipated well
in advance. One way to do so is to track simultaneously the exchange rate. In
Figure 2 we show the paths over time of the price of gold in terms of the ﬂoating
paper greenbacks issued to ﬁnance the Civil War, as well as of the relative yield
on gold bonds—speciﬁcally, Macaulay’s (1938, p. A218) gold railroad bonds—
relative to the London consol yield. The announcement that greenbacks would be
redeemed at par nearly four years later obviously was not credible early in 1875.
Rather than falling, the greenback price of gold initially rose. Only later in that
yeardidthegreenbackbeginitsappreciationtowardpar.5 Theconcomitantdecline
in the bond spread is impressive—around 200 basis points.
Argentina returned to the gold standard on October 31, 1899, nearly a decade
afterabandoninggoldintheBaring Crisis. Startingin1891, thecountryembarked
upon a deﬂationary policy so as to be able to resume gold convertibility at an
unchanged parity, even though the currency utimately was pegged at a devalued
rate (see della Paolera and Taylor, 2001). Figure 3 shows how both the exchange
rateandtheborrowingspreadoverLondonbehaved: bothmovedstronglytogether
over the 1890s, suggesting that expectations of resumption and borrowing costs
were indeed strongly interrelated. When Julio Roca, a strong advocate of the
gold standard, was re-elected to the presidency in the fall of 1898, the currency
appreciated sharply and the spread over British borrowing costs fell, eventually
droppingfurtherastherestoredgoldstandardendured. Rocaannouncedthereturn
togoldbeforecongressonMay25,1899andresumptionoccurredsixmonthslater.
By the end of 1902 Argentina’s external borrowing spread was nearly 200 basis
points lower than when Roca came to power.
Argentina’s brief return to gold at the prewar parity, lasting from August 1927
and December 1929, had no such dramatic effect on its foreign borrowing costs.
5For discussionsofthe period,see Mitchell(1908)andBarrett(1931). Smith andSmith(1997)
formally analyse exchange-rate dynamics prior to resumption.
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The spread over U.K consols changed hardly at all over the period 1926–28. The
striking contrast with the previous resumption epsiode is consistent with the view
that Argentina’s brief interwar gold standard had a much smaller beneﬁcial effect
on the public ﬁnances than its prewar counterpart.
Australia’s experience in the 1920s resembles that of Argentina, as shown in
Figure 4. Australia returned to gold at the same time as Britain (April 1925); like
Britain,itreturnedattheprewarparity. Thedeclineinthegovernment’sborrowing
cost (relative to London), however, was delayed and rather small. Australia effec-
tively left gold at the start of 1930, well before Britain’s departure on September
19, 1931 ended the interwar gold standard. Australia’s abandonment of gold was
forced by severe economic problems originating in sharp falls in the prices of its
commodity exports (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 232–36). The borrowing spread over
London rose sharply after Australia went off gold, but it had already begun to rise
in December 1929, the month before the country effectively left the gold standard.
The spread increase clearly was driven by fears of default that quickly forced the
country to curtail gold convertibility, not by a progressive abandonment of gold
per se. Thus, for Australia also, the interwar gold standard was less successful
than its prewar predecessor in instilling conﬁdence in foreign investors.
France’s interwar return to gold offers a contrast to the two preceding cases;
however, France returned to gold at a sharply devalued parity. The return occurred
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Notes: See text and appendix. Source: Global Financial Data and other sources.
in stages, and Figure 5 shows how the exchange rate (franc price of dollars) and
the external borrowing spread over London covaried. Raymond Poincaré formed
a government in July 1926 as the franc reached a low point, driven by a crisis of
public deﬁcits and inﬂation. As a result of the ﬁscal consolidation measures that
the Poincaré government immediately introduced, the franc appreciated sharply
and ﬁnally was pegged in December 1926. In the period leading to this de facto
embrace of gold—bythen, sterling along with thedollarwas linked to the metal—
the external borrowing spread over London dropped sharply. This response lends
support to Sargent’s (1993) thesis that Poincaré’s consistent ﬁscal and monetary
reform package enjoyed great credibility in the eyes of the ﬁnancial markets. That
is not the end of the story, though. As Figure 5 shows, France’s de jure adoption
of the gold standard on June 25, 1928 was followed by a further large decline in
the borrowing spread. France remained on gold long after Britain departured, and
one sees that in 1932 its borrowing spread over London paper rocketed upward
as the worldwide depression progressed. But for this important case of a country
returning to gold at a devalued parity, adherence coincided with a large decline in
the cost of foreign borrowing through September 1931.
Obviouslysuchevidencecanbesuggestiveonly,asitfailstocontrolforseveral
potential determinants of spreads, so we now turn to a more formal statistical
analysis of a broader sample of countries.
93 Econometric analysis
We now proceed with a formal comparative analysis of sovereign borrowing risk
in the prewar and interwar periods. Following Bordo and Rockoff (1996), we
investigate the relationship between the dependent variable country risk, mea-
suredbythebondspreadoverLondon(measured inpercentagepointsperannum),
SPREADit = YIELDit − YIELDUK,t, and selected macroeconomic policy vari-
ables that could play a role for country i and time t. One such variable is gold
standard adherence, measured by dummy variables: GSit, which takes the value
1i fo nd a t et country i is on gold at any parity, GSPARit, which takes the value
1i fo nd a t et country i is on gold after 1914 at its prewar parity, and GSDEVit,
which takes the value 1 if the country is on gold at a devalued parity after 1914. In
our interwar analysis we also introducea heretofore unexamined dummyvariable,
GSOFFit,whichtakesavalueof1forcountriesthathadadoptedgoldatsomepoint
but departed prior to Britain’s September 1931 departure. Absent this dummy, the
cost associated with leaving gold in crisis conditions would inﬂate our estimate of
the beneﬁt of adopting gold. But as in the Australian case discussed above, the
rises in spreads that accompanied exchange rate collapses starting in 1929 were
the result of global forces such as declining commodity prices and reduced capital
ﬂows, and thus were much more than a penalty for gold abandonment per se.
We also include the lagged inﬂation rate, INFLi,t−1. As a ﬁnal macro explana-
tory variable, we examine the effects of lagged public debt levels, measured by
the ratio of nominal debt to nominal output, DEBTi,t−1. Country ﬁxed effects are





or “β”) a measure of “market risk” in the form SPREADW,t = YIELDWORLD,t −
YIELDUK,t, where this term is the GDP-weighted average world spread over the
“safe rate” (London) for the countries in the sample at time t.6
Usingpooledannualdataforalargesampleofcountries,thebasicﬁxed-effects
regression equation is then of the form
SPREADit = αi + βiSPREADW,t + γXit + uit, (1)
6We experimented with other ways to control for time speciﬁc asset market shifts, such as
simple time dummies, but the results appear robust.
10where typically the vector X includes gold standard adherence, the lagged debt
ratio, lagged inﬂation, and possibly other control variables.
Such a speciﬁcation can be rationalised in a model where the government’s
bond rate reﬂects the central rate plus a default premium, and in which new gov-
ernmentborrowingdependsonthecurrentinterestrate. Inthatcase, theregression
coefﬁcients are reduced-form coefﬁcients incorporating the government’s incen-
tive to borrow less when the rate charged is high, but they nonethless indicate
whether the gold standard and macro fundamentals affected perceived risk. When
we discuss “effects” of explanatory variables on the spread below, we refer to the
reduced-form regression coefﬁcients.7
For the dependent variable SPREAD, due care must be taken in constructing
measures of country risk to ensure that the bonds in every case are properly com-
parable across countries. We want SPREAD to capture the effects of default risk
only, and not the effects of the potential exchange rate changes that are inherent in
bonds’ differing currency denominations. In this case, since we are using Britain
as the base country, we elect to focus only on government bonds of long maturity
(greater than ﬁve years, and usually at least ten) and payable in gold or sterling.
It is therefore necessary to eliminate the polluting effects of Britain’s departures
from the gold standard—from August 1914 to April 1925 and from September
1931. Hence, we focus on only two periods: a prewar period based on annual
December yields from 1870 to 1913, and an interwar period based on June yields
from 1925 to 1931. This affords us up to 44 observations in the time dimension
for the prewar sample, and up to seven for the interwar sample.
ToconstructSPREAD wethenneed bondyieldsforeach country, alsopayable
in gold or sterling, from which we can subtract the consol yield. Finding them is
not always an easy task. Because, ideally, our test requires a gold or sterling bond
as quoted in London, data construction requires considerable caution. It is a well-
7Suppose that
SPREADt = a + bDEBTt + cZt + vt,
wherethe variablesZt are varioussolvencyindicators. Furthermore,supposethatnew government
borrowing depends negatively on the spread,
 DEBTt =− dSPREADt + wt.














11known problem that in standard secondary sources, the attributes of a particular
bond issue are not always readily apparent.
Bordo andRockoff(1996)splittheirsamplesintogoldbondsand paperbonds,
ﬁnding little effect of gold standard adherence on the yields of bonds payable in
domestic paper. Care is needed because many paper bonds in fact contained gold
clauses or exchange clauses, which (if enforceable) would have allowed creditors
toextractpaymentinspecieorhardcurrencyifthedebtordevalued. Thiscondition
was frequently stipulated for borrowers with poor reputations for ﬁscal and mon-
etary stability. Then as now, such borrowers suffered from “original sin”—that is,
an inability to issue debt denominated in one’s own currency. Only a handful of
countries have been capable of own-currency borrowing in the last two centuries
(Rousseau and Sylla, 2003). The history of nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury bond issuance is only now being fully explored to give us some insight into
the constraints that faced borrowers with respect to details of contracts, including
denominations of debt issue (Bordo, Meissner, and Redish, 2002; Flandreau and
Sussman, 2002).8
A great many data on bond yields are contained in the reference Global Finan-
cial Data (GFD), of which we make extensiveuse. For our purposes, however, we
sometimesfoundit necessary to corroboratethetypeofbond quotedinGFD using
bond manuals such as Kimber’s Record and other sources. In many cases, the
bond yields quoted in GFD failed to satisfy ourrequirements, being only domestic
rather than London quotations, or possibly yields denominated in domestic cur-
rency, and this eliminated several countries from our database (such as Denmark
in the prewar years and Spain in the interwar years). We treated the United States
during the 1870s just as Bordo and Rockoff (1996) did, using Charles Calomiris’s
seriesongoldequivalentyields,foraperiodinwhichthetermsofpaymentwerein
doubt (Bordo, Meissner, and Redish, 2002). Countries like Belgium, France and
8If a government’s gold standard commitment had been permanent, noncontingent, and com-
pletely credible, then its paper bonds would have been “as good as gold” and any fall in external
borrowingcostswouldhavebeeninheritedbythepaperbonds. Itthereforemayseempuzzlingthat
Bordo and Rockoff could not detect gold standard effects on paper yields. If countries’ exchange
rate commitments lacked credibility, why not their commitments to repay gold-denominated debt
at par? Prewar gold standard conventions, however, allowed for suspension in the event of certain
contingencies (notably, wars) provided resumption took place at the previous gold parity (Bordo
and Kydland, 1995). Thus, paper bonds might entail some shorter-term exchange risk even for
countriesfollowingconventionalgoldstandardrules,whereasgold-orsterling-denominatedbonds
were supposedly payable in the currency of denomination regardless of the issuing government’s
circumstances. The different behavior of indexed and paper yields certainly warrants further in-
vestigation. Cook (2002) discusses the case of Russian bonds.
12Germany—which issued debt in domestic currency—had to be omitted in the pre-
war sample, but we were able to ﬁnd interwar data on appropriately denominated
Belgian and French bonds traded in New York and on the German Dawes Loan
as quoted in London. Missing data were often a problem too. Some of the gaps
in GFD, especially in the interwar years, could be ﬁlled by consulting newspapers
such as the Investor’s Monthly Manual (for a London quote) or, as a last resort,
the Wall Street Journal (for New York quotes on gold-linked bonds). Full details
of the construction of the yield data are in the appendix.
Other complications affect our use of historical bond yield data. The compiler
of the GFD source, Bryan Taylor, warns in the documentation (September 2000)
that: “Forriskierissues,suchasLatinAmericancountries,notonlywastherearisk
that coupons could be eliminated, but that the entire issue could go in default. At
that point, the implied yield becomes meaningless, and any yield over 10% before
World War Two should be treated as implying that the issue was in default on
either coupon, on principal, or on both.” Because our model is intended to capture
country risk under conditions with a positive probability of full repayment, once
an issue actually is in default we might expect its yield to be volatile indeed, and
perhaps far removed from any simple linear prediction given by a model of the
form(1). Suchdefaultswerenotuncommoninourdata, andinsomecasesspreads
grew to 20, 30 or even 60 percentage points on some issues, implying prices of
less than 10% of par value.
Although such steep discounts on bonds affect only a small part of oursample,
we discuss below the steps we can take to ensure that these types of observation
do not bias the regression estimates. As might be expected, many of these obser-
vations correspond to periods of severe political unrest or uncertainty associated
with revolutions (e.g., Mexico in the 1920s), civil wars and their aftermath (e.g.,
Uruguay in the 1870s), or similar disturbances. This is not to deny that military
strife is often a key determinant of bond yields (Ferguson, 2001), but we are not so
naive as to claim that a model like (1) might function well with merely the addi-
tion of dummies or qualitative variables for “War,” “Assassinations,” and the like.
Instead, we concentrate on a narrower and cleaner speciﬁcation where a positive
probabilityof fullrepayment also presupposessufﬁcient politicalstabilityto make
linear approximations meaningful.9
9Still, it is certainly a worthy topic for future research to expand this kind of model to include
measuresofconﬂict,whetherinternalorexternal,politicalormilitary. Toquantifythenatureofany
given war would appear intractable, however. A more proﬁtable direction might be to experiment
with other determinants of country risk including now-standard “institutional” measures such as
democracy, rule of law, property rights, and so on.
13For independent variables we centre our analysis on the key policy regime
variable that was, during this era, at the heart of monetary policy: the adoption or
suspension of the gold standard. We construct a dummy variable GS that reﬂects
eachcountry’spositioninagivenyearonthispolicydimension(ongoldequalsone,
and off equals zero). The appendix gives details of our coding procedure, which
ofnecessityinvolvessomewhatsubjectivejudgementsevenforsuch an apparently
clear-cut variable as gold-standard adherence. Several countries (notably Spain
and Italy before 1914) spent many years posturing as “shadow” members of the
gold standard—ﬁxing and defending their exchange rate, yet not fully embracing
gold convertibility or other “rules of the game.” In the classiﬁcations of many
scholars this leads to a delicate decision as to whether such cases should be treated
as on or off gold (see, e.g., Martín Aceña, 2000; Fratianni and Spinelli, 1984).
Thesituationduring theinterwarperiod is murkierstill. After World War One,
manycountriesﬁrststabilisedtheircurrenciesdefactowithrespecttogold,moving




gold standard is a key reason scholars have viewed it as imperfectly credible. Our
classiﬁcationcorrespondslargelytodejuregoldstandardadherence,aswedescribe
in the appendix.10
The other economic control variables in our model allow ﬁscal, monetary, and
macroeconomic conditions to affect country risk. DEBT is a measure of the pub-
lic debt to GDP ratio of the country (lagged one year), typically based on central
government debt. This variable is included to allow for the possibility that mar-
kets might impose more severe credit conditions on highly indebted governments,
where, ceterisparibus,defaultriskishigher. INFL is ameasureoftherateofprice
inﬂation (lagged one year). Because many countries operated on fractional gold
10Our interwar dates, although generally in agreeement with those of Ofﬁcer (2001), contradict
in a number of cases the annual codings reproduced in Eichengreen (1992, pp. 188–90).
A general problem with the type of coding we use is that reinstatement of gold was in some
cases anticipated (recall Section 2), with some fraction of the beneﬁcial spread effects possibly
front-loaded. Inthatcaseourestimatesofthebeneﬁtofgoldadherencecouldbebiaseddownward.
One way to deal with the problem within this paper’s framework might be through anticipatory
dummies. Inourview, however,the diversecircumstancesof countries’pathsbackto goldwarrant
a case-by-case analysis with more detailed macroeconomicand political control variablesthan are
availablefor broadcross-sectionalwork. Thiswe leave forfutureresearch. In cases such asthat of
interwar France (Section 2), for example, one would ideally disentangle the beneﬁts of gold from
those of the Poincaré stabilisation measures that made de jure resumption possible two years later.
14backing, this variablecould beimportantas a way formarkets to detect slippagein
goldstandardcommitmentsbygovernments,forexample,atthestartofepisodesof
overvaluation that might lead to reserve loss followed by eventual suspension and
debt crisis.11 These two variables have straightforward interpretations as policy
descriptors.
We also add two more economic variables often seen in country risk studies.
The ﬁrst is EXPORTS, a measure of the export to GDP ratio, which reveals the
capacity of the country to earn the foreign exchange needed to service externally-
held debt. This indicator is commonly used as a risk measure today by emerging
market credit analysts. A ﬁnal variable, LOGY, a measure of real income per
capita (relative to the sample mean), serves as a catch-all variable that proxies for
all manner of social, political, institutional and ﬁnancial developments along the
road to modernisation that might make a country a better credit risk.12
The gradual convergence of bond spreads evident in Figure 1 warns us that the
dynamics of evolving country risk might not be simple. In particular, the ﬁgure
suggests high levels of persistence or serial correlation in bond spreads, and it is
easy to imagine why. Bond spreads are a function of reputation, which in capital
markets, as in any other repeated game, cannot be built overnight. Instead, one’s
reputation in the previous period is likely to have a substantial inﬂuence on one’s
reputation today. In our empirical results we present two alternative estimates
based on different approaches to modellingof thepersistence in spreads. One way
istoimpoundallofthepersistenceintheerrorterm,usinganAR1model. Another
wayistousealaggeddependentvariablemodel,sothatspreadsthemselvesfollow
a partial adjustment process towards long-run equilibrium.
3.1 Prewar ﬁndings, 1870–1913
As a cross check we begin our analysis with a simple attempt to replicate the
ﬁndings of Bordo and Rockoff (1996), who used a sample of just seven countries
in the prewar era, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Italy and theUnited
States. Based on pooled data for gold bonds (267 observations), their headline
numberfortheimpactofthegoldstandardoncountryriskwaspresentedasfollows:
11BordoandRockoff(1996)usethegapbetweenmoneygrowthandrealoutputastheirmeasure
of monetary laxity, but, even if we do not assume a stable velocity, the outcome variable INFL can
serve as an adequate measure of excess money supply growth.
12Real income per capita (at PPP prices) and the export ratio were included in the pre-1914
country risk analysis of Flandreau et al. (1998).
15Indeed, if we were to single out one number to represent our ﬁndings
withrespecttothesigniﬁcanceofthegold-adherencedummyitwould
be 40 basis points.…In otherwords, all other things equal, the rate on
a gold bond would be 40 basis points lower if the country were on the
gold standard. Other factors, perhaps related to regional preferences,
undoubtedly also played a role in determining country-risk premia.
But ouranalysissuggestsa willingnesstocommittothegoldstandard
wasanimportantdeterminantofriskpremiaestablishedintheLondon
capital market. (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996, p. 413.)
We are in broad agreement with this conclusion. Regression 1 of Table 1
shows that our data, some of it from different sources, enables us to duplicate
the Bordo-Rockoff ﬁnding on their country sample. We have slightly longer time
series that yield 301 observations for the Bordo-Rockoff countries, but we ﬁnd,
as they did, that adopting the gold standard was worth a reduction in spread of
about 40 basis points. The effect is highly statistically signiﬁcant. As Bordo
and Rockoff noted, strong serial correlation in this context renders ordinary least
squares (OLS) invalid, so like them we employ an AR1 speciﬁcation, allowing for
possiblydifferentautoregressiveparametersineachmemberofthepanel.13 Thatis
weestimateanequationoftheform(1)undertheassumptionthatuit = ρiui,t−1+ it
and  it are white noise disturbances.
Here, and throughoutthissection, theβi coefﬁcientsare not shownto conserve
space but they also accord with expectations and past results, being higher in
“riskier” peripheral countries. Country ﬁxed effects, which are reported, are high
for peripheral countries such as Brazil (237 basis points), Italy (172), Argentina
(180),andChile(160),butlowerforthecorewesternoffshoots,Australia,Canada,
and the United States (101, 41, and 34 basis points, respectively).
Regression 2 now expands this analysis substantially by using our augmented
data set covering more than 20 countries from 1870 to 1913. The sample size here
increases by a factor of nearly three, to 871 observations. The model performs
poorly in that the estimated effect of the gold standard (again roughly 40 basis
points) is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Still, we ﬁnd that
this result is an artefact of a few badly-behaved outliers in the data. Speciﬁcally,
13Unlike BordoandRockoff(1996),we donotemploySURmodels, butwe have exploredSUR
results for limited samples and ﬁnd the results broadly similar. However, the larger cross-section
sizeinourlaterregressionscallsforalargeparametersetintheunrestrictederrorcovariancematrix
under SUR, sometimes too large a set for the available degreesof freedom. In all of our tables, the
country coefﬁcients identiﬁed vertically along the left are the country-speciﬁc intercepts.
16Table 1: Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1870–1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Bordo All SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD
Rockoff <20 <15 <10
Observations 301 871 856 848 831
R2 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.87
GS -0.43(3.38) -0.44(1.60) -0.61(2.99) -0.54(2.97) -0.35(2.61)
ARG 1.80(5.57) 1.78(1.79) 1.93(2.85) 1.89(3.10) 1.72(3.38)
AUS 1.01(4.79) 1.02(1.79) 1.18(2.83) 1.12(2.98) 0.93(3.18)
AUT — -0.14(0.11) -0.14(0.15) -0.14(0.17) -0.14(0.21)
BRZ 2.37(6.38) 2.33(2.03) 2.46(3.09) 2.43(3.40) 2.30(3.91)
CAN 0.41(1.04) 0.42(0.37) 0.59(0.70) 0.52(0.69) 0.33(0.56)
CHL 1.60(4.92) 1.61(1.68) 1.61(2.24) 1.61(2.49) 1.60(3.22)
EGY — -0.94(0.97) -0.78(1.09) -0.84(1.31) 0.10(0.18)
GRC — -3.70(4.55) 3.09(3.53) 2.05(1.44) 2.21(1.97)
IND — 0.44(0.28) 0.52(0.40) 0.48(0.41) 0.38(0.46)
ITA 1.72(6.31) 1.75(2.44) 1.77(2.81) 1.75(3.11) 1.71(4.50)
JPN — 2.48(2.30) 2.57(3.95) 2.51(4.28) 2.39(4.42)
MEX — -4.93(4.62) -0.40(0.45) -0.79(0.72) -0.62(0.67)
NOR — 0.58(0.48) 0.74(0.84) 0.68(0.86) 0.49(0.78)
NZL — 0.80(0.61) 0.96(1.00) 0.90(1.05) 0.71(1.04)
PRT — 1.74(1.54) 1.76(2.11) 1.75(2.34) 1.73(7.58)
RSA — 1.28(0.74) 1.44(1.14) 1.38(1.22) 1.19(1.33)
SPA — -4.51(4.69) -3.66(6.21) -1.51(4.36) -0.32(0.67)
SWE — 0.76(0.82) 0.92(1.42) 0.86(1.48) 0.68(1.43)
TUR — 0.10(0.11) 0.26(0.38) 0.20(0.33) 0.01(0.01)
USA 0.34(0.88) 0.37(0.33) 0.56(0.72) 0.48(0.68) 0.24(0.42)
URU — -0.69(0.39) -0.53(0.41) -0.59(0.51) -0.30(0.33)
min(ρi) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.23
max(ρi) 0.75 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88
Mean empire — 0.50(0.88) 0.65(1.52) 0.60(1.54) 0.61(2.03)
Mean nonempire — -0.03(0.10) 0.86(3.63) 0.88(3.82) 0.91(5.05)
Difference (Empire effect) — 0.53(0.91) -0.21(0.48) -0.28(0.69) -0.31(0.97)
Notes: Dependentvariableis SPREAD. Country-speciﬁcβi andρi are notreported;t-statistics are
shown in parentheses. Mean empire and mean nonempire show average ﬁxed effect for the group.
Sources: See text and appendix.
17when we exclude observations with very high spreads (over 2,000 or 1,500 or
1,000 basis points) as in Regressions 3, 4 and 5, we ﬁnd that the effect of the
gold standard is strong and statistically signiﬁcant, though the effect is a little
smaller in Regression 5, where truncation is more severe, and bigger in the other
regressions. These ﬁndings requires the exclusion of very few data points, since
even Regression 5, the most restrictive, still has 831 observations, a loss of less
than 5% of the sample. Of course, these are the data points that correspond to
issues in default trouble, often the result of military or political crises, as noted
above. Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption that our country risk model is
adequate for less dire circumstances.14
Our broader aim is to consider the role of additional country characteristics in
determiningcountryrisk. Sincecertaingeopoliticalfeaturesofcountriesremained
fairly constant in this period, a natural place to start is by examining the country
ﬁxed effects for clues. And since Britain is being used as the reference country in
theanalysis,animportantfeaturetoexaminewouldbeanyspecialcountry-speciﬁc
links to Britain. An obvious criterion is membership in the British Empire.
Ever since Marx and Hobson, students who view history through the lens of
politicaleconomy—whetherfromleft, rightorcentre—haveregardedimperialism
as a leading vehicleon the road to economicglobalisation. Its epitome, the British
Empire, is seen as, amongst other things, a privileged economic zone in both trade
and capital markets. Empire connections among countries are believed to have
conveyed some distinct advantages to would-be borrowers in London. Davis and
Huttenback (1986) and Edelstein (1981) have suggested that Empire membership
meant a lower cost of capital to both public and private sectors in this era.
Taking the argument further, Ferguson (2002) places these ideas in the context
of a broader political and ﬁnancial history and claims support, on economic if not
on other grounds, for his case that the British Empire was a global public good:
My hypothesis is that empire—and particularly the British Empire—
encouragedinvestorstoputtheirmoneyindevelopingeconomies. The
reasoning is straightforward. Investing in such economies is risky.
They tend to be far away and more prone to economic, social and
political crises. But the extension of empire into the less developed
14Due to the more restricted samples for which data on the additional control variables are
available, we virtually never again encounter observations with spreads larger than 1,000 basis
points. The only exceptional case is that of interwar Mexico, which, being still in the throes of
post-revolutionary instability, exhibited high and volatile spreads and therefore is excluded from
our analysis.
18world had the effect of reducing such risks by imposing, directly or
indirectly, some form of European rule. In practice, money invested
in a de iure British colony such as India (or a colony in all but name
like Egypt) was a great deal more secure than money invested in a de
facto “colony” such as Argentina.
This effect should be—and is—quantiﬁable. There are two ways of
posing the crucial question. First, did the existence of the British
Empire make investors more willing to put their money into poorer
countries than they would otherwise have been? More precisely, did
being a British colony reduce the cost of borrowing for a country?
The hypothesis here is that it did, because being a colony implied a
no-default guarantee. This was arguably a better “seal of good house-
keeping” even than membership of the gold standard, though most
British colonies had both. (Ferguson, 2002, p. 12.)
Here, one contrast to the Bordo and Rockoff (1996) claim is quite explicit.
Empire,notthegoldstandard,waswhatreallycountedforattractingcapitalinlarge
quantitiesatlowcost,thoughthetwoforcesneednothavebeenmutuallyexclusive
and, indeed, were positively correlated. To settle the debate econometrically,
however, requires careful controls for these and other risk determinants.
It is imperative,then, thatwe considerthe“Empireeffect” in ouranalysis. The
question is whether countries within the Empire enjoyed preferential access to the
market, and we interpret that to imply that, all else equal, Empire countries should
exhibit a smaller ﬁxed effect than others. This can be studied by looking at each
individual intercept in the regression. Or, for a summary comparison of the two
groups,wecanaskwhetherthemeanﬁxedeffect intheempiregroupwaslessthan
the mean in the nonempire group. The mean ﬁxed effect for each group is shown
in the bottom panel of Table 1, together with the t-statistic for the estimated mean
(where the null is a zero mean).
Our results are not too favorable to the idea of an “Empire effect” during the
so-called Age of High Imperialism. In Regression 2 even the sign is wrong. In
the possibly more robust regressions (3, 4, and 5) the sign is correct, and Empire
membership seems to be worth about 20 to 30 basis points as a point estimate; but
this was no more valuable than going on gold—and, unlike the effect of gold, this
impact is not statistically signiﬁcant.15
15A “strong” test of the Empire hypothesis would be to also require the β coefﬁcients to be
zero for Empire members. That would imply that their returns did not co-vary with changes in the
19A detailed look at some of the ﬁxed effects reveals some of the problem cases.
Consider Regression 5. In the nonempire group only some countries (once we
include the effect of being on gold) paid a large risk penalty, namely Argentina
(about137basispoints),Brazil(195),Chile(125),Greece(186),Italy(136),Japan
(204), and Portugal (138). Others appear to have paid no premium at all. Yet even
therichest countryin theworld(by somemeasures)and EmpirememberAustralia
had to pay a statistically signiﬁcant risk premium of about 58 basis points, though
no other Empire countries were so burdened.16
ThereasonsforAustralia’splightareeasytoguess, giventhesevereandendur-
ing consequences of the widespread defaults associated with the 1890 crash and
subsequent depression, which crippled Australia’s banks and dented the country’s
reputation in the London market (see Davis and Gallman, 2001). The Australian
results show that, even if empire borrowers were proof against outright sovereign
default, they were not proof against a severe economic crisis. Some narrative evi-




was well within “contagion range” of Argentina and Brazil) seemed not to have
been penalised in capital markets despitebeing outsidethe formal empire. Empire
status was neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for preferential access to the London
market. Muchseemedtodependonotheraspectsofthebehavioroftheborrower—
for our purposes, an unobservable.
In Table 2 we use the full data set to check the robustness of the preceding
results to additional controls for debt ratios, inﬂation, and relative income per
capita. Regression 1 in Table 2 adds DEBT and INFL to the spread equation.
As we noted in the introduction, the omission of DEBT in particular could very
plausibly lead to biases.18 We are now restricted to a much smaller sample than in
global spread—in other words, that they were “safe” assets like the British consol itself, up to a
white noise error. But this hypothesis is very decisively rejected. Although the β coefﬁcients are
not reportedin the tables to conservespace, these results are available from the authorson request.
16These estimates are 35 basis points less than the reported intercepts because we also include
the effect of going on gold.
17Forexample,duringtheJapanesegovernment’sinternaldebateoverinvestingforeignreserves
during the mid-1890s, the ﬁnance minister asked “Are the public bonds of the Indian Government
as safe and reliable as those of England itself?” (Matsukata, 1899, p. 221).
18Flandreauetal.(1998)arguethatamajorfactordrivingtheevidentconvergenceofbondspreads
after the early 1890s and through 1914 is worldwide inﬂation resulting from gold discoveries, a
factor that caused both an unexpected reduction in countries’ ratios of public debt to nominal
20Table 2: Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1870–1913: Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 546 546 546 546
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
GS -0.50(2.57) -0.50(2.58) -0.50(2.58) -0.49(2.58)
DEBT 0.12(0.58) -0.44(0.86) -0.06(0.16) -0.01(0.05)
INFL 0.21(0.68) 0.90(0.63) 0.41(0.57) 0.13(0.44)
DEBT × periphery — 0.63(1.13) — —
INFL × periphery — -0.71(0.48) — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 0.25(0.56) —
INFL × nonempire — — -0.22(0.28) —
EXPORTS — — — 0.71(0.64)
LOGY — — — -0.88(2.50)
ARG 0.60(0.60) 0.56(0.57) 0.57(0.57) 7.79(2.53)
AUS 0.96(2.50) 1.54(2.50) 1.14(2.29) 8.35(2.75)
AUT 0.00(0.00) -0.08(0.09) -0.07(0.08) 6.77(2.27)
BRZ 1.04(0.95) 0.93(0.84) 0.95(0.86) 6.97(2.66)
CAN 0.18(0.25) 0.17(0.25) 0.21(0.29) 7.52(2.49)
CHL 1.46(3.04) 1.43(2.96) 1.43(2.93) 8.20(2.94)
EGY 0.67(0.87) 0.69(0.90) 0.60(0.79) 6.37(2.58)
IND 0.67(1.27) 0.65(1.22) 0.73(1.37) 6.26(2.68)
ITA 1.58(1.38) 1.52(1.32) 1.52(1.32) 8.22(2.83)
JPN 0.46(0.53) 0.41(0.47) 0.41(0.47) 6.70(2.50)
NOR 0.62(0.75) 0.73(0.91) 0.60(0.73) 7.32(2.59)
NZL 0.25(0.25) 0.80(0.77) 0.43(0.41) 7.65(2.35)
PRT 1.48(2.35) 1.42(2.24) 1.42(2.22) 7.91(2.99)
SPA -1.72(1.89) -1.82(1.98) -1.82(1.95) 5.13(1.77)
SWE 0.61(0.61) 0.69(0.69) 0.60(0.60) 7.82(2.60)
USA 0.49(0.59) 0.49(0.58) 0.49(0.59) 7.88(2.55)
URU -0.78(0.82) -0.86(0.90) -0.85(0.88) 6.24(2.10)
min(ρi) 0.29 0.12 0.30 0.21
max(ρi) 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.82
Mean empire 0.54(1.49) 0.77(1.84) 0.62(1.59) 7.23(2.63)
Mean nonempire 0.49(1.51) 0.45(1.40) 0.44(1.30) 7.24(2.62)
Difference (Empire effect) 0.06(0.15) 0.32(0.69) 0.18(0.40) -0.01(0.04)
Notes and Sources:S e eT a b l e1 .
21Table1, sinceournew variablesDEBT andINFL are notavailableforallcountries
in all years. From a maximum of 871 observations, we are now down to 546. For
this pre-1914 sample, the gold standard seal of approval is still strong in all of the
regressions (and estimated to be at or near 50 basis points).
Perhaps surprisingly, neither DEBT nor INFL is signiﬁcant in Regression 1,
althoughbotharecorrectlysigned. Thegoldstandardcommitmentappearedstrong
enough that markets could rely on contained inﬂation and debt repayment. In an
interesting twist, we also ﬁnd that the Empire thesis is again rejected, but for a
more powerful reason. In this smaller subsample, all countries could expect, once
on gold, to converge to the British bond yield.
Regression 2 performs a different kind of robustness check. What if the mar-
kets priced risk differently among mature versus emerging debtors, or core versus
periphery? To test this we partitioned the sample into core and periphery, and
then interacted the macroeconomic variables DEBT and INFL with the periphery
dummy (deﬁned in the appendix). The results show that, at conventional sig-
niﬁcance levels, the hypothesis that periphery risk was priced differently can be
rejected, although there is a hint that high periphery debt levels were punished
rather more severely on the margin. Here once again, as in all speciﬁcations in
Table2, the“Empireeffect” is found to bestatisticallyindistinguishablefrom zero
based on the difference between the mean ﬁxed effects.
Regression 3 attempts to resuscitate the “Empire effect” another way. Perhaps
the advantages of Empire were not a lower unconditional level of country risk,
but a more tolerant view of debt and inﬂation variables by the markets? As in
Regression2wetestthishypothesisbyinteractinganEmpiredummyvariablewith
themacroeconomicvariables DEBT and INFL. The hypothesisis rejected at usual
signiﬁcance levels. Default prospects were not priced signiﬁcantly differently
in Empire countries by this yardstick either, despite a faint hint of stronger debt
punishment for non-empire borrowers.
GDP and a more widespread adherence to the gold standard. For the pre-1914 period, Flandreau
et al. investigate borrowing spreads over London using a country sample different from that of
Bordo and Rockoff (1996)and an econometric speciﬁcation encompassing the public debt ratio to
GDP as well as gold standard adherence. Unlike us, they ﬁnd a strong positive effect of public
debt on borrowing spreads even under the classical gold standard (and even in a linear model of
spread determination). Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain their complete data set,
which includes some “European peripheral” countries with highly indebted governments, so we
cannotsay for sure whether differencesin the countrysample drivethe discrepancyin results. The
Flandreau et al. estimates of the value of gold standard adherence before 1914 are, as we noted
above, similar to those that we and Bordo and Rockoff ﬁnd.
22In Regression 4 we assess the impact of the two economic additional control
variables EXPORTS and LOGY. Export ratios seem to have had no statistically
signiﬁcant impact on the risk premium, but the level of development turns out
to be highly statistically signiﬁcant, as might have been expected. “Less devel-
oped” countries (as measured by income per capita) faced higher country risk. As
noted, the statement of this result is simpler than its interpretation. Does LOGY
measure some economic attraction such as productivity? Or is it a proxy for
someinstitutionaldevelopment,whetherlegal, ﬁnancial or political? Whateverits
meaning—it is perhaps best seen as a continuous alternative to the dichotomous
periphery dummy—we ﬁnd strong evidence to support the inclusion of such a
control variable. However, its inclusion alters none of our previous main ﬁndings.
In particular, debt appears not to matter and the inﬂation coefﬁcient, while of the
right sign, is statistically insigniﬁcant.
For a ﬁnal sensitivity check we adopted a different speciﬁcation than any em-
ployed in the literature so far, and one that might be more robust since it does not
depend on such strong assumptions. First, we augment the model (1) to include a
lagged dependent variable, so that we estimate
SPREADit = αi + φ(L)SPREADit + βiSPREADW,t + γXit + uit, (2)
whereφ(L)isapolynomialinpositivepowersofthelagoperatorL. Weretainﬁxed
effects and possibleserial correlation. Thischoice of model could bejustiﬁed on a
number of grounds. Lagged-dependent variable models can be hard to distinguish
from the previous AR1 models we have used, but they might better approximate
bond market behavior if agents employ Bayesian updating of country risk. In that
setting, today’s predicted risk is a linear combination of lagged risk and today’s
new information. Thus, deviations from steady state risk may persist for a long
time, whereas in the simple AR1 model the ﬁtted value adjusts immediately and
only the error term has persistence.
Naturally, such a ﬂexible form as this calls for a different estimation strategy.
Panel ﬁxed effects with lagged dependent variables induce bias in OLS estimates,
and the solutionis to use the generalised method of moments (GMM). We employ
theArellanoandBond(1991)one-stepdynamicpanelestimator,treatingtheworld
risk and gold standard variables as exogenous, and the lagged debt and inﬂation
terms as endogenous but predetermined. The model is estimated in differences
using at least twice lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments.
Selected results are shown in Table 3, and, despite the very different estimation
23strategy, they show a basic consistency with the message from Tables 1 and 2.19
The long-run effect of the gold standard on country risk is now about 65 basis
points and generally statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the Bordo-Rockoff
methodologymighthaveslightlyunderstatedthebeneﬁtsofthegoldstandard. The
othercoefﬁcientsarestatisticallyinsigniﬁcant,althoughinﬂationhaseconomically
signiﬁcant estimated effects across the four speciﬁcations. In the ﬁnal column
EXPORTS is statistically insigniﬁcant, and LOGY has a marginal signiﬁcance
level (8 perecent), leading us to select the ﬁrst column as our preferred GMM
prewar speciﬁcation. Since the GMM model is estimated in differences, all ﬁxed
effects drop out, meaning that this framework is necessarily silent on the “Empire
effect.”
Like Bordo and Rockoff (1996), we conclude overall that the main signiﬁcant
policy determinant of country risk in the prewar period appears to have been gold
standardadherence. Gold was apparentlyagood enoughseal ofapprovalbyitself,
and risk was priced without much reference to public debt levels, inﬂation, or
whether the country was core or periphery, empire or nonempire.
3.2 Interwar ﬁndings, 1925–31
Most narrative accounts of the transition from the classical gold standard to the
interwar period stress one key difference: the rebuilt gold standard was a pale
imitation of its predecessor. It did not long endure, and seemed to lack both
credibility and stability. As Temin (1989, p. 33) remarks, “The combination of
changed conditions and some policy choices of the 1920s … created great strains
in the operation of the interwar gold standard.”
The key question is whether such a regime change can be detected in the data.
To that end we repeat the previous country risk modelling exercise for the pe-
riod 1925–31. One difﬁculty here is that after 1914, many countries suspended
and then resumed the gold standard at new, devalued parities that partially ex-
propriated prior bondholders. In a conventional view of reputation (Bordo and
Kydland, 1995), devaluationwould be viewed with suspicionby markets, and fear
of such reactions prompted some governmentsto deﬂate in order to restore prewar
parities—Churchill’s pursuit of $4.86 is perhaps the most famous example. To
account for differential market treatment of par maintainers and par adjusters, we
use the policy dummy variables GSPAR and GSDEV described at the start of this
19In these regressions, preliminary analysis indicated the need for two lags to ensure no second
order residual autocorrelation.
24Table 3: Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1870–1913: GMM Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 546 546 546 546
Sargan 466.27[0.00] 492.00[0.00] 531.95[0.00] 574.76[0.00]
m2 -0.26[0.79] -0.25[0.80] -0.34[0.73] -0.75[0.45]
SPREAD(t-1) 0.70(19.43) 0.70(19.96) 0.71(20.32) 0.74(21.13)
SPREAD(t-2) -0.32(10.07) -0.31(10.10) -0.31(9.96) -0.28(9.03)
GS -0.40(2.17) -0.38(2.17) -0.39(2.31) -0.20(1.24)
DEBT 0.03(0.17) -0.27(0.55) -0.15(0.57) -0.08(0.61)
INFL 0.53(1.55) 1.17(0.92) 0.35(0.50) 0.34(1.08)
DEBT × periphery — 0.32(0.62) — —
INFL × periphery — -0.68(0.51) — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 0.14(0.45) —
INFL × nonempire — — 0.19(0.25) —
EXPORTS — — — 0.76(0.74)
LOGY — — — -0.92(1.71)
Long-run coefﬁcients
GS -0.65 -0.63 -0.63 -0.33
DEBT 0.04 -0.44 -0.25 -0.13
INFL 0.86 1.90 0.57 0.56
DEBT × periphery — 0.53 — —
INFL × periphery — -1.10 — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 0.22 —
INFL × nonempire — — 0.31 —
EXPORTS — — — 1.24
LOGY — — — -1.50
Notes: Dependent variable is SPREAD. Country-speciﬁc βi are not reported, p-values are shown
in bracketsand t-statistics are shown in parentheses. “Sargan”is the Sargantest of overidentifying
restrictions, distributed χ2 squared. m2 is the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in
residuals of order 2 is 0, distributed asymptotically N(0,1). The one-step estimator is used, and
debt and inﬂation terms are treated as endogenous. See text for details.
Sources: See text and appendix.
25section, as suggested Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoff (1999). A second problem
concerns departures from gold in the gathering crisis of 1929–31. It is implausible
that Australia, for example, could have avoided an increase in borrowing spreads
in 1930 simply by somehow clinging to the gold standard and its rules. Since we
therefore do not want to impute such spread increases to departures from gold per
se,weintroducethenewdummyvariableGSOFF.Athirddifﬁcultyisthatwhereas
previouslywehadupto44observationspercountryinthetimedimension,wenow
have at most 7; it is therefore unwise to estimate country-speciﬁc autoregressive
parameters ρi, so we adopt a speciﬁcation with ρi = ρ for all countries.
Tables4and5canbedirectlycomparedwithTables1and2. Table4showsthe
interwaranalysisforthefullsample,143observations,withnoadditionalcontrols.
Regression 1 in Table 4 suggests that unconditionally (that is, without reference
to the restoration of the prewar parity), the gold standard had at best a minimal
impact on spreads (10 basis points). And even this small estimated effect is far
from statisticalsigniﬁcance. Regression 2 partitions theGS dummy to account for
postwar devaluations. According to these estimates, countries returning to gold at
the prewar parities gained nothing in reduced spreads (indeed the sign of GSPAR
is wrong), whereas countries like France that returned after devaluing received
a beneﬁt of roughly 35 basis points that falls just shy of conventional statistical
signiﬁcance levels.
These ﬁndings run quite contrary to the Bordo-Edelstein-Rockoff empirical
results. Echoing the conventional wisdom of interwar policymakers, they found
that sticking to the prewar parity was rewarded by markets with a continued (and
large) discount on borrowing costs of over 100 basis points. But countries that
resumed at adevaluedparity gained nothing,as theircredibilitywas damaged. We
note that in both regressions of Table 4 the variable GSOFF has a large coefﬁcient
(60–70 basis points) and is highly signiﬁcant. Spreads rose sharply for primary
exporters like Australia, Argentina, and Uruguay that left gold before Britain did.
Were we to omit the variable GSOFF, we would ﬁnd approximately a −30 basis
point coefﬁcient on GSPAR and a −50 basis point coefﬁcient on GSDEV (see
Obstfeld and Taylor 2003), but as we have argued, these seeming beneﬁts of gold
adherencewouldbeanartefactoftheharshexternalconditionsperipheralcountries
faced at the onset of the Great Depression. Consistent with that interpretation, we
note that if we omit the GSOFF dummy but drop the crisis year 1931, the results
move closer to those in Table 4.20
20As we explain in the appendix, there is disagreement among scholars as to whether Uruguay
could be considered to be on gold in 1928–29. We believe that the markets took the country’s de

































Mean empire -0.07(0.27) -0.20(0.72)
Mean nonempire 1.15(6.30) 1.22(6.56)
Difference (Empire effect) -1.23(4.49) -1.42(4.79)
Notes: Dependentvariableis SPREAD. Country-speciﬁcβi are notreported;t-statistics are shown
in parentheses. Mean empire and mean nonempire show average ﬁxed effect for the group.
Sources: See text and appendix.
27What could possibly explain our result—a reversal of the classic ideology—
according to which parity keepers gain nothing, and the market, if anything, re-
wards devaluers? The result is not so far fetched when markets try to assess which
promises actually can be kept. In this respect, our ﬁndings support the theoretical
conclusion of Drazen and Masson (1994) that policymakers may hurt rather than
enhance their credibility through policies that appear “tough” in the short term but
are too draconian to be sustained for long. These initial results are far from con-
clusive, of course, given the moderate statistical signiﬁcance of the gold standard
effect, but the question certainly warrants further research.
Our ﬁndings are so obviously at variance with the results of Bordo-Edelstein-
Rockoff that some explanation is needed. The contrast could be ascribed to differ-
ences in concept (use of secondary-market bond yields, mostly in London, versus
new issue yields in New York) and differences in estimation method. Of these
features in our empirical approach, the ﬁrst, at least, seems necessary if we are
to make comparisons on an equal footing with the prewar period and Bordo and
Rockoff (1996). For the same reason an autoregressive correction of some sort
would seem essential, although Bordo, Rockoff, and Edelstein (1999) used simple
OLS. One reason for their choice, we think, was an unfortunate feature of Cleona
Lewis’s interwar data on New York bond issues: these were primary issues, so not
every country had a bond issue every year, leading to gaps in the time series, and
hence the impossibility of an AR1 correction. A more subtle difﬁculty, which our
approach confronts, is an inherent problem of sample selection bias when using
primary-issue data of Lewis’s kind. Countries tend only to ﬂoat bonds when they
are creditworthy, so this yields a biased sample, as noted earlier. In contrast, by
using secondary market data from London, we can track countries in all years,
whatever their predicament.
Table 5 adds additional controls. The coefﬁcient of GSDEV is virtually the
same—roughly 35 basis points, a number smaller than our estimated reward for
prewar adherence to gold—but it becomes statistically signiﬁcant. In addition,
GSPAR remains essentially zero while GSOFF is slightly lower but still highly
signiﬁcant. In contrast to the prewar results, public debt now has a statistically
signiﬁcant positive effect on borrowing costs. This is a second key contrast with
the classical prewar gold standard. All four regressions in Table 5 indicate that
facto gold adherence at its prewar parity seriously (and indeed, the country’s borrowing spreads
were somewhat lower in 1928–29than before or after). However, the only signiﬁcant effect (in all
our regressions) of adopting the alternative coding for Uruguayis to reduce the measured effect of
GSOFF. This result is expected because a relatively small group of countries left gold before June
1931 and Uruguay suffered a large increase in its borrowing spread.
28Table 5: Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1925–31: Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 137 137 137 137
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
GSPAR 0.04(0.27) 0.02(0.15) 0.04(0.26) 0.07(0.55)
GSDEV -0.37(2.21) -0.37(2.23) -0.37(2.17) -0.33(2.01)
GSOFF 0.58(3.46) 0.57(3.38) 0.58(3.38) 0.56(3.27)
DEBT 1.41(3.33) 1.23(2.64) 1.38(1.52) 1.31(2.94)
INFL 0.04(0.36) 0.02(0.18) 0.24(0.09) 0.09(0.90)
DEBT × periphery — 1.18(1.04) — —
INFL × periphery — 0.08(0.30) — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 0.05(0.05) —
INFL × nonempire — — -0.21(0.08) —
EXPORTS — — — 0.15(0.13)
LOGY — — — -1.19(2.16)
ARG -0.87(1.60) -1.29(1.93) -0.88(1.57) 8.86(1.97)
AUS -2.71(3.06) -2.39(2.50) -2.63(1.67) 7.45(1.55)
AUT 0.92(1.75) 0.74(1.31) 0.91(1.71) 10.54(2.37)
BEL -0.12(0.19) 0.03(0.04) -0.14(0.21) 9.94(2.15)
BRZ 1.61(3.05) 1.30(2.11) 1.60(2.95) 9.87(2.59)
CAN -1.40(2.58) -1.31(2.37) -1.38(2.21) 8.44(1.86)
CHL 0.84(1.54) 0.43(0.64) 0.83(1.47) 10.00(2.34)
DNK -1.81(3.51) -1.77(3.37) -1.82(3.46) 8.27(1.78)
EGY -0.78(1.38) -1.29(1.68) -0.75(1.05) 7.05(1.95)
FIN 0.31(0.59) 0.21(0.39) 0.30(0.57) 9.59(2.24)
FRA -1.21(1.44) -0.92(1.03) -1.24(1.32) 8.84(1.87)
GER 2.82(5.41) 2.86(5.42) 2.81(5.32) 12.54(2.80)
HUN 3.71(7.03) 3.50(6.02) 3.71(6.87) 12.92(3.03)
IND 0.26(0.47) -0.14(0.20) 0.29(0.44) 7.97(2.21)
ITA 2.46(2.68) 1.82(1.64) 2.44(2.59) 12.14(2.66)
JPN 0.11(0.21) -0.36(0.52) 0.10(0.19) 9.14(2.18)
NZL -2.48(2.73) -2.13(2.17) -2.41(1.45) 7.69(1.61)
NOR -1.64(3.01) -1.54(2.77) -1.65(2.96) 7.81(1.78)
PRT 0.73(1.29) 0.05(0.06) 0.72(1.21) 9.71(2.31)
RSA -1.27(2.32) -1.71(2.43) -1.25(1.88) 7.65(1.84)
SWE -0.79(1.53) -0.74(1.42) -0.79(1.52) 8.95(1.99)
USA -1.79(3.47) -1.74(3.33) -1.80(3.43) 8.54(1.78)
URU 3.25(5.46) 2.60(2.93) 3.24(5.19) 12.90(2.85)
ρ 0.40(8.09) 0.39(7.31) 0.40(7.95) 0.40(7.59)
Mean empire -1.40(3.12) -1.49(3.22) -1.36(1.66) 7.71(1.83)
Mean nonempire 0.50(1.96) 0.30(0.94) 0.49(1.74) 10.03(2.29)
Difference (Empire effect) -1.90(5.91) -1.80(5.34) -1.85(2.16) -2.33(6.27)
Notes and Sources:S e eT a b l e4 .
29although the markets cared little about being on gold in the interwar period, they
did care about public debt levels. For example, a coefﬁcient of 1.41 on DEBT in
our table (Regression 1) means that a 10 percentage point increase in a country’s
debt to GDP ratio would be expected to raise country risk by 14.1 basis points.
Inﬂation is never statistically signiﬁcant. Regressions 2 and 3 of Table 5 allow
for the inclusion of periphery and empire interaction terms, but, based on their
statisticalsigniﬁcance, theydonotseemtobejustiﬁed. Regression4addscontrols
for the export ratio and level of development. Exports are incorrectly signed but
statistically quite insigniﬁcant. The income coefﬁcient is, however, statistically
signiﬁcant and somewhat larger than in the prewar results in Table 2. Once again,
we caution that the interpretation of the LOGY variable is unclear since it could
be a proxy for various institutional, economic or other factors affecting risk. Even
so, in our AR1 models it appears to have a robust and fairly stable coefﬁcient both
prewar and interwar, so we again choose the ﬁnal column as our preferred AR1
speciﬁcation.
Whencomparedtoourearlierprewarﬁndingsbasedonthesamespeciﬁcations,
these results show that the value of being on gold at the traditional parity fell to
zero afterthewar. Based onthelatter,thebottomlinefortheinterwarperiodcould
then be summed up as: the gold standard strikes out but the Empire strikes back.
Table5 suggests that the value of being in the Empire was much higher than being
ongold,andmuchhigherthanithadbeenpriortothewar. Basedontheanalysisof
mean ﬁxed effects, an Empire member might have expected a borrowing discount
of anywhere between 180 and 230 basis points.
This ﬁnding makes intuitive sense. Prior to World War One, the long trend of
globalisationintheworldeconomyandaconvergenceonasetofmoreorlessliberal
economic policy principles (a kind of “London consensus”) had placed economic
actions at centre stage in the minds of market actors. The sudden specter of total
war, the shock of political instability and revolution, the rise of belligerence in the
coreeconomies, andageneralairofnoncooperativepolicymakingcouldwellhave
changed the weight given to various signals in the world bond market. Suddenly,
thesafehavenofEmpireinvestmentsmighthavelookedmoreattractive,justasthe
gold standard began to lose its glitter. And, more generally, this interpretation sits
comfortablywiththeconventionalwisdomthattheworldeconomyas awholewas
becoming increasingly organised along regional, bilateral, or imperial lines in the
interwar years, due to preferential policies in both trade and ﬁnance. For example,
after the onset of war, in the 1910s and 1920s, Britain began to curtail nonempire
access to the London capital market and by the 1930s the British Empire had
becomea heavily protected trading zoneunder theauspices ofthe Ottawaaccords.
30In a further sensitivity check, Table 6 reports GMM estimates for a lagged-
dependent-variable model of spreads. Using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-
step dynamic panel estimator once again, we ﬁnd results broadly consistent with
theAR1estimatesfromTables4and5,althoughstandarderrorsaremuchhigher—
which is perhaps no surprise given the shortness of the interwar panel and the loss
of one cross-section due to differencing. Here, returning to the gold standard
at the prewar parity appears to have yielded no reduction in spreads, but parity
devaluationshowsariskreductionsomewherearound20basispoints,aneffectthat
iseconomicallybutnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant. Debtgenerallywaspunishedbythe
markets, more harshly on the periphery and perhaps outside the Empire. Inﬂation
appears not to matter except for column 3 where the effects are implausibly large
and offsetting in empire and nonempire cases. This strange result argues against
such aspeciﬁcation. In ourpreferred speciﬁcation, reported in thelast column, the
long-run coefﬁcient on debt is higher than in Table 5. Importantly, Tables 4 and
5 consistently show that interwar debt effects were large and positive compared
to the (statistically insigniﬁcant and often wrongly signed) impacts found for the
prewarperiod in Tables 2 and 3. Also in theGMM interwarregressions in Table6,
we ﬁnd, as before, that higher income per capita reduced spreads.
To summarise, by the late 1920s the market’s approach to risk pricing had
changed dramatically. If markets rewarded gold adherence at all, they did so only
when the adoption of gold was based upon a realistically competitive exchange
rate. In addition, policymakers faced a world in which the mere word of their
commitmentto the gold standard was no longer good enough—now creditors also
wanted to see the books.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In the sovereign bond market before 1914, the gold standard did indeed confer a
“seal of approval,” whereas macro fundamentals, measured by public debt and in-
ﬂation, seem to have mattered little, if at all. Apparently adherence to gold, in and
of itself, was sufﬁcient to enhance market credibility during that era. Membership
in the British Empire was neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient condition for pref-
erential access to London’s capital market before 1914. The results accord with
historians’ views on the high degree of economic globalisation attained before the
First World War.
For the interwar period, a return to gold after devaluation seems to have been
more credible, notwithstanding the arguments that led Britain and other countries
31Table 6: Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1925–31: GMM Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 132 132 132 132
Sargan 21.56[1.00] 45.61[1.00] 38.67[1.00] 39.14[1.00]
m2 0.37[0.71] 0.32[0.75] 0.08[0.94] 0.80[0.42]
SPREAD(t-1) 0.30(2.10) 0.26(1.91) 0.30(2.20) 0.05(0.39)
GSPAR 0.14(0.85) 0.17(1.08) 0.04(0.25) 0.21(1.38)
GSDEV -0.17(0.85) -0.10(0.50) -0.29(1.47) -0.17(0.93)
GSOFF 0.37(1.60) 0.50(2.17) 0.33(1.42) 0.43(1.97)
DEBT 1.82(1.98) 0.85(1.04) 1.06(0.67) 2.20(2.72)
INFL 0.51(0.57) 0.29(0.30) 5.64(1.70) -0.02(0.03)
DEBT × periphery — 3.48(1.69) — —
INFL × periphery — -0.50(0.39) — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 1.03(0.62) —
INFL × nonempire — — -6.26(1.82) —
EXPORTS — — — -0.07(0.05)
LOGY — — — -1.70(2.55)
Long-run coefﬁcient
GSPAR 0.19 0.23 0.06 0.22
GSDEV -0.24 -0.13 -0.41 -0.18
GSOFF 0.53 0.67 0.47 0.45
DEBT 2.58 1.14 1.52 2.32
INFL 0.72 0.39 8.06 -0.02
DEBT × periphery — 4.69 — —
INFL × periphery — -0.67 — —
DEBT × nonempire — — 1.47 —
INFL × nonempire — — -8.96 —
EXPORTS — — — -0.08
LOGY — — — -1.80
Notes and Sources:S e eT a b l e3 .
32to return to gold at par. Indeed, returning at par yielded essentially no beneﬁt, and
only a return after devaluation (as in the case of France) was beneﬁcial, though
not quite as beneﬁcial as being on gold prior to World War One. Moreover, for
core and periphery countries alike, high public debts were punished, suggesting
thatpolicymakers’roomformaneuverhad been curtailed. In thetroubledinterwar
environment,Empiremembershipemerged as an importantqualiﬁcationforlower
borrowing costs.
Both our results on the drop in spreads associated with going on gold, and
on markets’ differential response to public debt before and after the war, suggest
that the interwar gold standard was less credible than its pre-1914 predecessor. It
remains to reconcile these results fully with ﬁndings such as those of Hallwood,
MacDonald, and Marsh (1996) that indicate a credible gold standard during the
late 1920s, at least in the short-term bond markets. Perhaps the bond markets
adoptedalongerperspectiveunderwhichprotractedadherencetounchanginggold
parities seemed less probable than short-term adherence. The question certainly
deservesfurtherresearch, butourﬁndingsonbondmarketsservetoilluminatehow
different the interwar global capital market was from its antecedent, the classical
gold-standard regime of 1870–1914. Evidently the global convergence in the
bond market prior to 1914 was replaced by quite different, disintegrative forces
after 1914.
Finally, if we seek lessons from the past, our results have some implications
for today’s attempts to gain capital market credibility through the use of pegged
exchangerates. It is clear that thepost-WorldWarOne politicaldevelopmentsthat
rendered interwar exchange-rate commitments less credible have not receded in
the meantime. Thus, policymakers should not expect to gain market credibility
even through seemingly irrevocable exchange rate commitments. Absent robust
fundamentals and complementary economic and institutional reforms, efforts to
forswear discretionary exchange rate changes are of questionable value.
33Data Appendix
The database covers the period 1870 to 1939 at an annual frequency. The core countries
are deﬁned as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. The empire countries are deﬁned as Australia,
Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. The peripheral countries are deﬁned as
Argentina, Austria(andAustria-Hungary), Brazil,Chile,Egypt,Finland,Greece,Hungary,
India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and Uruguay. The base
country for yields is the United Kingdom. Before World War One, Turkey refers to the
Ottoman Empire and Austria denotes Austria-Hungary (and there are no independent data
for Hungary). There are missing data for most variables.
Exchange rate
ExchangerateversustheU.S.dollarfromBordoandSchwartz(1997)andGlobalFinancial
Data (GFD), except as follows.
Argentina: from della Paolera and Taylor (2001).
Chile: 1870–79 annual average from Braun et al. (2000).
Gold standard
The gold standard dummy variable is equal to one when a country is on the gold standard,
otherwise zero. The gold standard parity dummy (GSPAR)is equal to one when a country
rejoins gold after 1914 at parity that is the same as the previous one. The gold standard
devalued dummy(GSDEV)is equal toone when acountry rejoins gold atparity after 1914
that is devalued relative to the previous one. (There are cases where countries rejoined
gold at a revalued parity, such as India in the 1920s, but these are not coded in any special
way.)
Prewar coding. Data are from Meissner (2002), available for all countries in all years,
except as follows:
Argentina: On gold for 1899–1902 (see della Paolera and Taylor, 2001).
Belgium: Off gold in 1926 (see Eichengreen, 1992, p. 168 et seq.).
India: Offgold 1870–97 following Hawtrey(1947) and Eichengreen (1992) and based
on exchange rate volatility.
Uruguay: On gold for 1885–99 (Luis Bértola, private communication; we have no
exchange rate data for Uruguay prior to 1885 to verify adherence).
Interwar coding. As discussed in the text, the interwar coding of gold standard adher-
ence involves greater subjective judgment than for the prewar period. In addition, because
we use June observations for the interwar period, annual summaries of adherence are
patently insufﬁcient; we must know the month, and in some cases the day, of entry to or
34exit from the gold standard. We do not attempt to distinguish among various degrees of
adherence, that is, gold bullion standard, gold coin standard, or gold exchange standard.
In most cases, however, we demand not only that a currency be stable de facto in terms
of gold, but that it be convertible de jure, with the free import and export of gold allowed
by the issuing country. Countries on gold are considered to leave the gold standard if they
prohibit cross-border gold ﬂows or impose other exchange controls, even if they do not
simultaneously devalue or ﬂoat their currencies.
The dates that we use for the interwar transitions to and from the gold standard are as
follows:
On Gold Off Gold
Argentina Aug. 1927 Dec. 1929
Australia April 1925 Jan. 1930
Austria March 1925 Oct. 1931
Belgium Oct. 24, 1926 March 1935
Brazil Dec. 18, 1926 Dec. 7, 1929
Canada July 1, 1926 Jan. 1929
Chile Jan. 11, 1926 July 1931
Denmark Jan. 1927 Sept. 1931
Egypt April 1925 Sept. 1931
Finland Dec. 31, 1925 Oct. 1931
France June 25, 1928 Sept. 26, 1936
Germany Oct. 1924 July 1931
Hungary April 1925 Aug. 1931
India March 1927 Sept. 1931
Italy Feb. 26, 1928 Dec. 1934
Japan Jan. 1930 Dec. 1931
New Zealand April 1925 April 1930
Norway May 1928 Sept. 1931
Portugal July 1, 1931 Oct. 1931
South Africa April 1925 Jan. 1933
Sweden March 1924 Sept. 1931
Uruguay Jan. 1928 Dec. 1929
United States June 1919 April 1933
Our sources are as follows:
Argentina: Brown (1940, pp. 401 and 893).
Australia: Eichengreen (1992, pp. 192 and 235).
Austria: Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1928, p. 562 and Brown (1940, p. 926).
Belgium: Brown (1940, p. 426) and Yeager (1976, p. 359).
35Brazil: The “on gold” date is for de facto adoption of a gold peg through a currency
reform law. See Fritsch (1988, p. 122). The departure date, from Fritsch (p. 156), is the
dayonwhichtheBancodoBrasilwithdrew foreign exchange support. Fritsch(p. 122–23)
explains that the currency reform law provided for a phased transition from de facto to
de jure convertibility, with the date of de jure credibility left open and dependent on the
level of government gold holdings. Brazil left gold, however, before the transition was
completed. Because Brazil’s adherence to gold was codiﬁed in legislation, we use the date
of passage as our “on gold” date.
Canada: Shearer and Clark (1984, pp. 282 and 297) and Brown (1940, pp. 396 and
906).
Chile: Brown (1940, pp. 396 and 912).
Denmark: Lester (1939, p. 200) and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
Egypt: The “on gold” date is inferred from the exchange rate’s behaviour against
sterling, as reported in GFD, and Britain’s date of adherence to gold. The “off gold” date
is from Brown (1940, p. 1075).
Finland: Brown (1940, pp. 396 and 1075).
France: Yeager (1976, pp. 329 and 362). We treat France as being off gold during
June 1928.
Germany: Brown (1940, p. 469) and Yeager (1976, p. 340).
Hungary: Eichengreen (1992, p. 192) and Brown (1940, p. 1198).
India: Brown (1940, pp. 839 and 1075).
Italy: Brown (1940, p. 951), Kindleberger (1986, p. 162), and Yeager (1976, p. 360).
Japan: Yeager (1976, p. 330) and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
New Zealand: Yeager (1976, p. 323, n. 30) and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
Norway: Lester (1939, p. 213) and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
Portugal: The Economist, June 6, 1931, and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
South Africa: Yeager (1976, p. 323, n. 30) and Brown (1940, p. 1075).
Sweden: Yeager (1976, p. 323, n. 30) and Lester (1939, p. 229).
Uruguay: De facto adoption inferred from Ofﬁcer (2001) and the exchange rate’s
behaviour, as reported in GFD. December 1929 date for gold abandonment from Brown
(1940, p. 893) and Kindleberger (1986, p. 89), though the currency was allowed to
depreciate below par in April 1929. According to a private communication from Luis
Bértola, Uruguay never returned to gold after August 1914; instead it simply pegged the
exchange rate. Brown’s account suggests, however, that contemporaries viewed Uruguay,
like its larger neighbor Argentina, as being effectively on gold, and we take that view in
our coding. In the text we discuss how our results change if Uruguay is considered to be
off gold throughout 1925–31.
United States: Brown (1940, pp. 207–8 and 1075).
36Yield
See discussion in the text. Yield on long-term gold or sterling government bonds (at least
ten years) measured typically by the coupon-price ratio, with deﬁnitions and sources as
follows, based on London quotations where available.
Argentina: 1884–1913 from della Paolera (1988). 1914–34 from Nakamura and
Zarazaga (2002).
Australia: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the N.S.W. 5% Terminable 1874/1902
(1870–87); N.S.W. 4% funded Stock 1912 option (1887–1900); all N.S.W. and Common-
wealth issues maturing in more than six months (1901–15); 5.25%, 5.5% and 5% bonds
(1920–40). Australian prices are used from 1875 to 1887, and from 1894 to 1915.
Austria: From GFD. For pre-WWI Austria-Hungary the bonds quoted are the Gold
5s (1879–1915); for interwar Austria the bonds quoted are the 6s of 1923–43 (1923–32)
quoted in London and payable in sterling.
Belgium: No prewar yields (except in domestic currency). 1925–33 from the Wall
Street Journal. The bond is the 7% of 1955 quoted in New York.
Brazil: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 5s (1870–86); the Gold 4.5s (1887–99);
the 4.5s of 1883 (1900–13); the 5s of 1912 (1914); and the Funded 5s of 1914 (1915–37).
Canada: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 5s (1860–73); the 4s of 1910 and 1935
(1874–1924); and the Gold 5s of 1952, the latter quoted in New York (1925–40).
Chile: 1870–1918 From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 6s (1870–74); the 5s (1875–
86); the 4.5s (1887–1918. 1919–33 from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Times, and The
Economist. The 4.5% Bond of 1886 is used between 1919 and 1930. Thereafter the 6%
Loan of 1929–62. Both debt instruments were issued in London and were payable in
sterling.
Denmark: 1919–33 from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Times, and The Economist.
The bond quoted is the 3% Sterling Loan of 1897–1948. This bond was issued by the
Danish government in London and was payable in Sterling.
Egypt: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the Uniﬁed Stock (1870–1931), which had
a variable coupon rate of 7% through March 1877, 6% through June 1882, and 4% from
July 1883 until 1931.
Finland: 1991–1917 fromGFD.1919–33fromInvestor’s MonthlyManual, TheTimes,
andTheEconomist. Thebond quoted isthe6%Sterling Loanof1923–63. Thiswasissued
in London and its associated payments were made in sterling pounds.
France: Noprewaryields (except indomestic currency). 1925–33 from theWallStreet
Journal. The bond is the 7% of 1949 quoted in New York.
Germany: No prewar yields (except in domestic currency). 1925–38 from GFD. The
bond quoted is the 7% Dawes Loan of 1924.
Greece: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 5s of 1824/1879 (1870–86) and the
Monopoly 4s (1887–1924).
37Hungary: Not included before WWI; see Austria. From GFD. The bond quoted is the
7.5% Dawes Loan of 1924 (1924–39).
India: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 5s of 1880 (1870–73); 4s of 1888 (1874–
80); 3.5s of 1931 (1881–1940).
Italy: 1919–30 from Investor’s Monthly Manual and The Times. The bond quoted is
the Maremmana Railway Bond issued in London and payable in sterling pounds.
Japan: FromGFD.Thebondsquotedarethe9s(1870–72); the7s(1873–97) converted
to 5s (1898–99); the Sterling 4s (1900–23); and the 6s of 1924 (1924–38).
Mexico: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 3s (1870–88); the 6s (1889–99); and
the External Gold 5s of 1899 (1900–32).
New Zealand: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 5s (1870–80); 4s (1881–94); 3s
of 1945 (1895–1914); no data available from 1914 to 1924; 3.5s of 1940 (1925–27); 5s of
1946 (1928–32); 4s of 1952–55 (1933–36); and 3.5s of 1953–57 (1937–40).
Norway: 1870–1918 from GFD.The bonds quoted are the 4.5s, (1876–80), 4s (1881–
86), 3.5s (1887–92) and 3s (1893–1918). 1921–31 from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The
Times, and TheEconomist. Thebond quoted isthe 6%Loan of1921. Thebond wasissued
in London and payable in sterling pounds.
Portugal: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the consols, which had a variable coupon
rate of 3% through October 1895, 1% from November 1895 through 1902, and 3% there-
after; no data for 1903, 1920–21, and 1928–30. Data are fourth quarter for 1931–32. June
1929and1930observations fromInvestor’s MonthlyManual andTheTimes, coupon-price
ratio. In July 1924 the Portuguese government unilaterally decided to pay all its foreign
currency debt in escudos except to foreign holders of its debt.
South Africa: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the Cape Colony 4.5s and 4s (1884–
1913); Union of South Africa 4s and 4.5s (1914–21); and the Union 5% Inscribed Debt
(1922–40).
Spain: From GFD. The bonds quoted are the 3s (1870–80) converted into 1s (1881),
to 4s (1882–1913). Part of the 4% perpetual exterior debt of 1882 was payable in foreign
currency but only at a ﬁxed exchange rate as written in the bond. This deal was only
available to non-Spaniards. After 1913 wehave no data, as all bond quotes are indomestic
currency.
Sweden: 1919–33 from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Times, and The Economist.
The bond quoted is the 3.5% loan of 1908. This bond was issued by the Swedish gov-
ernment in London and was payable in Sterling. The corresponding price is quoted in the
Investor’s Monthly Manual (1919–29) and The Economist (1930–33).
Turkey: 1870–1918 from GFD. The bonds quoted are the 6s of 1854 (1870–76); the
4.25% External Tribute Bonds (1877–1913); and theUniﬁed4% Bonds (1914–18). 1919–
33 from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Times, and The Economist. The bond quoted is
the Government 4% Uniﬁed Debt of 1903–1962. This bond was issued in London and its
payments were payable in sterling pounds.
38United Kingdom: From GFD. The bond quoted is the consol.
United States: 1870–1914 the Calomiris gold rate from Bordo and Rockoff (1996).
1914–39 from GFD. The bonds quoted are the 4s of 1925 (1915–1916); the 4% Liberty
Bonds (1917–18); and the Federal Reserve Board’s 10–15 year Treasury Bond index
(1919–39).
Uruguay: 1870–1918 from GFD. The bonds quoted yielded 6% through 1884, 5%
from 1885 through February 1893, and 3.5% thereafter. 1919–29 from Investor’s Monthly
Manual, The Times, and The Economist. The bond quoted is the Government 5% Gold
Bond of 1914 until 1922 and then the 5% External Loan 1919. This debt instrument was
issued in London and the associated payments were made in sterling pounds.
Exports
Exports in U.S. dollars from the collected volumes of Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995) as
collated by Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003). Converted to local currency using
the exchange rate.
Public debt
Total central government debt, unless otherwise stated. From Bordo and Jonung (1996)
for the years 1870–1913, and from United Nations (1948) for 1914–39, supplemented as
follows.
Argentina: 1884–1913 from della Paolera (1988).
Australia: from Barnard (1987).
Austria: Austria-Hungary 1880–1912 from series provided by Niall Ferguson based
on data collected by Marc Flandreau (unpublished).
Brazil: 1880–1910 consolidated (federal state and municipal) foreign debt in pounds
sterling from IBGE (1990) and domestic debt in contos from Levy (1995).
Chile: 1870–1913 from Mamalakis (1978–89, vol. 6, p. 493, Table 8.62) thence from
United Nations, with appropriate conversions of some series from (gold) pesos of 6 pence
(the interwar parity) to current pesos via the exchange rate series as above from Braun et
al. (2000).
Egypt: 1876–1913 from data provided by Niall Ferguson based on Crouchley (1938).
InterwarUNdataisforeign debtonly1924–29, butthedomestic debt(included after 1928)
was negligible.
Hungary: Interwar UN data is foreign plus domestic long-term debt only 1924–28,
but the domestic short-term debt was negligible.
India: From Reserve Bank of India (1954).
New Zealand: From Lloyd Prichard (1970).
Portugal: From Valério (2001, Table 9.7).
39Spain: From Barciela and Carreras (1989, Table 10.31).
Turkey: 1925–28 from Tezel (1982).
Uruguay: Unpublished data from Reto Bertoni, kindly provided by Luis Bértola, and
based on the ofﬁcial data from Anuarios estadísticos.
Nominal GDP
From the collected volumes of Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995), collated or augmented by
Bordo and Schwartz (1997) and GFD, supplemented as follows.
Argentina: 1884–1939 from della Paolera and Ortiz (1995).
Austria: Austria-Hungary 1880–1913 data provided by Niall Ferguson based on data
collected by Marc Flandreau (unpublished).
Belgium: Interpolations for missing data in 1925–26, 1928–29, and 1931–33.
Egypt: From Yousef (2002).
France: From Jones and Obstfeld (2001).
Greece: Missing data 1924–26 from backcast of 1927–29 trend.
Hungary: 1924basedon1925–26 trendsinrealGDPpercapitaandinﬂation, asbelow.
India: From Goldsmith (1983).
New Zealand: 1870–1933 from Hawke (1975); 1934–39 from Lineham (1968).
Portugal: From Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989).
Spain: From Prados (2002).
Uruguay: 1870–1936 real GDP from Bértola (1998), inﬂated using a price deﬂator,
and then rescaled and linked to the series from Bertino and Tajam (2000).
Real GDP per capita
From Maddison (1995), supplemented as follows, and interpolated as necessary.
Argentina: 1884–1939 using GDPfrom della Paolera and Ortiz (1995) and population
Vázquez Présedo (1971–76) scaled to the Maddison 1913 benchmark.
Austria: Austria-Hungary 1880–1913 from Schulze (2000) scaled to the Maddison
1913 benchmark, using population weights for Austria and Hungary.
Belgium: 1870–1913 estimate constructed from real GDP index and consumer price
index, scaled to the Maddison 1913 benchmark.
Chile: From Braun et al. (2000), scaled to the Maddison (1995) 1913 benchmark.
Egypt: From Yousef (2002), scaled to the Maddison (2001) 1913 benchmark.
Portugal: From Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989), scaled to the Maddison (2001) 1913
benchmark.
Uruguay: Real GDP from same sources as nominal GDP; population from Maddison
(2001) for 1870 and Mitchell (1993) for 1900–39; scaled to the Maddison (2001) 1913
benchmark.
40Inﬂation
Calculated as the rate of change of the consumer price index. From Bordo and Schwartz
(1997) and GFD, supplemented as follows.
Argentina: 1870–79 from Irigoin (2000); 1879–84 from Cortés Conde (1989); and
1884–1939 from della Paolera and Ortiz (1995).
Austria: Austria-Hungary 1880–1913 an implicit deﬂator of GDP, based on nominal
GDP as above and real GDP from Schulze (2000).
Brazil: Use implicit GDP deﬂator.
Chile: From Braun et al. (2000).
Egypt: Use an implicit deﬂator of GDP, based on nominal GDP as above, and real
GDP from Yousef (2002).
India: From Goldsmith (1983).
New Zealand: 1870–1914 use an implicit deﬂator of GDP, based on nominal GDP as
above, and real GDP from Maddison (1995).
Portugal: From Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989).
Uruguay: Use an implicit deﬂator of GDP, from same sources as nominal GDP
Government deﬁcit as a fraction of GDP
From Bordo and Schwartz (1997), supplemented as follows.
Australia: 1871–79 deﬁcit calculated as change in public debt as above. Nominal
GDP as above.
Austria: Austria-Hungary 1881–1912 deﬁcit data provided by Niall Ferguson based
on data collected by Marc Flandreau (unpublished). Austrian interwar deﬁcit calculated
as change in public debt as above. Nominal GDP as above.
Belgium: Deﬁcit calculated as change in public debt as above. Nominal GDP as
above.
Chile: From Braun et al. (2000).
Egypt: Deﬁcit calculated as change in public debt as above. Nominal GDP as above.
Hungary: Interwar deﬁcit calculated as change in public debt as above. Nominal GDP
as above.
India: Deﬁcit from Reserve Bank of India (1954). Nominal GDP as above.
NewZealand: 1890–1939deﬁcitfromLloydPrichard(1970). NominalGDPasabove.
Mexico: Deﬁcit calculated as change inpublic debt as above. Nominal GDPas above.
Portugal: From Valério (2001, Table 9.3). Nominal GDP as above.
South Africa: Deﬁcit calculated as change in public debt as above. Nominal GDP as
above.
Spain: From Barciela and Carreras (1989, Table 10.25). Nominal GDP as above.
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